When researchers examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance they often focus on two factors: CEO dismissals and outsider CEO succession. These factors are typically treated as independent events, but in fact they are intimately related processes with respect to their effects on organizational outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to examine this interdependence and demonstrate its significance for the link between executive turnover and subsequent firm performance.
There are three possible consequences of managerial turnover for performance:
the performance of an organization may decrease, increase, or remain relatively the same.
When Grusky (1963) studied the effect of management and coaching changes on the performance of baseball teams, he found a negative relationship between succession and performance. He argued that executive succession, because of its disruptive affect on an organization's processes and routines, has among its by-products a decline in performance. Other researchers have suggested that the disruption caused by organizational turnover should have the opposite effect and lead to improved performance. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that executive succession is a critical mechanism of organizational adaptation. Executive succession is an occasion to replace decision makers with others who are better equipped to deal with the organization's critical contingencies. In contrast to both the disruptive and adaptive views of executive succession, a third body of research suggests that succession plays no causal role in organizational performance or effectiveness. Gamson and Scotch (1964) , reanalyzing Grusky's data, argued that performance is a function of organizational processes that are largely outside the control of managers and that any relationship between succession and performance was spurious. This null finding view has been replicated in studies of managerial turnover in basketball (Allen, Panian, & Lotz, 1979) and football teams (Brown, 1982) .
Studies examining the effects of outsider succession versus insider succession have also been mixed. The dominant stream of this work is within the organizational demography tradition and suggests that outsiders are more likely to introduce and carry out significant organizational changes than are insider executives. Outsider executives are seen as possessing knowledge and competencies not possessed by insiders (Boeker, 1997) . Because outsiders can reconfigure preexisting communication relationships and established political coalitions, their presence has been found to be associated with improved performance (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; O'Reilly & Flatt, 1989) . However, some scholars are critical of this research and suggest that the "meaningfulness of this [outsider] distinction is somewhat unclear" for its impact on the firm (Zajac & Westphal, 1996: 64) .
The premise of this paper is that the mixed findings, in both turnover and succession research, can partly be accounted for by addressing two limitations in the existing research. First, existing perspectives on CEO succession do not recognize the theoretical problem of examining these events as independent processes. Detailed field research on dismissal and succession illustrates that these two processes are fundamentally intertwined and interact together in affecting subsequent firm outcomes, such as performance (Vancil, 1987; Zald & Berger, 1978) . Indeed, Gephart (1978: p. 554) recognized the theoretical importance of this linkage in his ethnography on leadership succession when he wrote: "Succession in organizations may be defined as the process whereby the particular incumbent of such a position changes. Succession therefore involves changes in the status of two or more persons, the predecessor and the successor." Thus, our study shifts the analysis of turnover from either the departure event or the successor event to the complete turnover event. We examine how the type of CEO departure and the origin of the successor, together, influence subsequent firm performance.
The second factor that may account for the mixed findings is that the empirical research on this subject is obscure about the precise mechanisms at work in the CEO turnover and firm performance relationship. Our review of the research on this topic found two distinct categories of explanations for linking CEO turnover to subsequent firm performance. The first category employs the concepts of strategic choice and argues that the substantive strategic changes that follow turnover mediate the link between turnover and performance (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996; Weisbach, 1988) . Thus it is not CEO turnover itself that impacts subsequent performance, but rather the subsequent strategic changes. One troublesome issue in this line of research is that the implied strategic changes that follow CEO turnover are rarely directly measured.
The second category of explanation linking CEO turnover to firm performance employs demographic concepts, particularly those related to the type of turnover and the origin of successors. This perspective suggests that the relationship between turnover and performance is largely dependent on the degree to which the type of turnover and origin of the successor affects internal organizational processes; specifically, the interaction dynamics among its executives (Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reilly, 1984) . Thus, it is not the subsequent strategic change, but the ability to alter an organization's political and social climate that affects performance. One troublesome issue in this line of research is that it rarely controls for the level of strategic change that accompanies CEO turnover.
The argument we advance here has strong parallels to the second stream of research, but takes seriously the theoretical and empirical implications of the strategic choice perspective. We posit that the degree of organizational disruption created by the predecessor CEO's departure and the potential for organizational change determined by the origin of the successor CEO are important factors affecting firm performance. By examining CEO turnovers among 200 organizations over a fifteen year period, our study demonstrates that the type of turnover a firm undertakes is associated with subsequent performance changes and that these changes are independent of a variety of other organizational changes.
TURNOVER AND PERFORMANCE
The dominant model in organizational research for linking organizational changes to organizational outcomes recognizes the importance of linking events such as CEO changes to performance outcomes. For example, scholars argue that the natural state of organizational activity is one of stability or equilibrium in which established patterns of actions reproduce themselves as a consequence of inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) and institutionalization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) . Accordingly, an organizational disruption is thought to be necessary to create conditions for organizational change (Romanelli & Tushman, 1986; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) .
Whether an organizational disruption leads to improved performance, however, is ultimately contingent on whether the grip of organizational inertia is broken. Researchers argue, for example, that the introduction of an outsider to the organization, particularly in a visible position, is one way for overcoming this resistance. Two possible underlying processes have been suggested for this link. One process involves the types of actions taken by the new entrant-actions that have substantive outcomes in the sense of having observable and measurable referents. This view suggests that strategic changes can be rationally designed to optimize firm performance. Examples of such decisions are resource allocation decisions including capital allocations or changes to the structure of the firm including downsizing.
A number of scholars have been critical of this perspective and suggest an alternative viewpoint. On the level of strategic change, these scholars argue, decisions are largely dictated by external constraint and are better predicted from conditions of resource dependence and mimetic isomorphism than the deliberate choices of managers (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983; March, 1978; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . In his influential programmatic article, Pfeffer (1983) argued that the primary benefit for organizations from external entrants is altering the status quo rather than any specific substantive actions. Within established task groups, for instance, detailed observational work has suggested that the introduction of an outsider is associated with more open and diverse problem solving practices, more extensive communication networks, and altered bases of competence and skills (Ancona, 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Milliken & Lant 1991; O'Reilly, Caldwell & Barnett, 1989) . Depending on the particular reconfiguration, changes to these subtle organizational dynamics are recognized to play an essential role in firm performance. In their study of pharmaceutical firms, Henderson and Cockburn (1994: p. 74 ) noted that changes from top-down control to management by committee "appeared to encourage extensive and sometimes unexpected exchanges of information across programs" and was an important determinant of the level of innovation. They argue that subtle social manipulations to organizational dynamics can make a significant contribution to subsequent firm performance. Our analysis therefore incorporates this perspective in theorizing about the processes by which turnover may effect firm performance.
CEO change can be thought of as a type of organizational disruption that can lead to improving performance when it alters internal organizational dynamics (Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992) . In particular, a brief examination of the past literature and various accounts on chief executive officer turnover indicates two dimensions of CEO change that have been conceptualized as critical to this relationship. First is the manner in which the CEO turnover is categorized with reference to the circumstances surrounding the predecessor CEO's departure and its potential for organizational disruption. The departure is usually classified as forced versus natural turnover. Forced turnover is the involuntary removal of a CEO. Natural turnover is the voluntary exit of a chief executive.
Forced removal is argued to be significantly more disruptive to organizational routines and processes when compared to a natural turnover such as planned retirement. Unlike the process of firing workers and lower level managers, the process by which chief executives are fired is a complex event characterized by significant political interactions between internal managers, directors, and outside interests such as investors and the media (Hirsch, 1986; Ocasio, 1994) . For example, Zald and Berger (1978) found that forced departures are dramatic political events requiring extensive coordination across a variety of interest groups. Moreover, because CEO firings are often precipitated by poor performance or exogenous environmental shocks, the disruption from forced departures is particularly acute.
The second dimension of CEO turnover likely to affect firm performance is with respect to the origin of the successor (e.g. insider versus outsider). This dimension points to the view that outside successors are more likely to be agents for organizational change. Gouldner's (1954) ethnography on outsider managerial succession in a mining firm stands as the classic statement on this topic. Gouldner (1954) found that outside successors are more likely to be an independent force in an organization and, thus, more likely to introduce organizational changes. The outsider executive, he argued, is unencumbered by political baggage and thus less invested in the status quo. Carlson's (1972) work on school superintendents adds grist for this view by demonstrating that career bound superintendents (outsiders) were more likely to break with traditional policies and patterns than place-bound superintendents (insiders). Research on top management teams illustrates that individuals promoted from outside the organization impart qualities and capabilities to the executive group which do not, and cannot, stem from the organization itself (Boeker, 1997) .
While the performance effects of CEO departure and the origin of CEO successors has been examined in separate studies, empirically the two are not independent. Executive succession consists of two events: the departure event and the succession event. The departure event is the manner in which the predecessor CEO exits the firm and creates the necessary apriori condition of succession--a vacancy. The succession event consists of the appointment of either an outsider or insider successor to fill the vacant position. Thus, organizational turnover necessarily involves a relationship between departure and succession and leads to our identifying four general types of succession events: (1) natural turnover followed by an insider; (2) natural turnover followed by an outsider; (3) forced turnover followed by an insider; and (4) forced turnover followed by an outsider. Which of the four types of CEO turnover a firm experiences affects subsequent changes to organizational performance.
The most common and orderly type of CEO turnover, natural turnover followed by an insider is recognized to be the least disruptive to organizational routines and processes and, therefore, least likely to lead to organizational changes. As Weber (1947) rightly noted, predictable leadership transitions are a fundamental attribute of stable organizations. Helmich (1974) , for instance, found that when inside officers are promoted to key administrative positions this tends to reflect stability and conservatism in organizational policies.
In sharp contrast to natural turnover followed by an insider is the forced turnover of a CEO followed by an outsider successor. This is considered the most disruptive type of organizational transition and the turnover with the strongest prospect for organizational change (Vancil, 1987) .
Forced termination of a CEO's employment is usually a response to poor organizational performance (Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Ocasio, 1994) . Forced departure creates the greatest organizational disruption since it interrupts the natural succession process. Forced departures, when combined with outsider succession, creates both a mandate for organizational change and the potential to realize this mandated change. In addition to making different strategic choices than an insider, outsider executives are more likely to break the cycle of homosocial reproduction in organizational promotions and appointments so prevalent in organizational life (Kanter, 1977) . This "outsider effect" in facilitating organizational changes has been demonstrated across a variety of industrial and organizational settings including the mining (Gouldner, 1954) , restaurant (Whtye, 1949) , and health care (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977) industries. Thus, combining the potential for change created by forced turnover and the realization of organizational change through bringing in an outsider executive, we predict:
Hypothesis 1: Forced turnover followed by an outsider successor will lead to an improvement in firm performance
In contrast to the above types of turnovers which reinforce either the status quo or organizational change, the remaining two types of turnover are conflicting. In the situations of either natural turnover followed by an outsider or forced turnover followed by an insider, influencing organizational change through succession is not effective.
When only one of these factors is present, i.e. forced turnover or outsider succession, change is inhibited and contradictory. For example, in the case of natural departure followed by an outsider successor, a likely split develops between the internal managers of the firm and the outsider CEO. The latter is identified as a threat who stands to gain from change and by circumventing the status and political monopoly controlled by the insider executives (Gouldner, 1954) . Because any proposed changes would redistribute existing tasks and rewards that were formerly the domain of specific individuals, the outsider CEO is resisted. Thus, a conflict develops in which the old procedures are reasserted or only slightly modified in order to overwhelm or potentially even sabotage any change introduced by the outsider.
The proposition that particular combinations of turnover and succession events are conflicting indicates that effectiveness is not simply a product of an outsider presence, but the institutional balance of power. The attempt to introduce change by outsider succession without the antecedent disruption to organizational routines and processes that accompanies forced turnover places the new CEO in a precarious position. The outsider is representative of outside authority, but can count on little direct support from the internal management which feels maligned because of the disruption to organizational routines (Gouldner, 1954) and the breaking of implicit contacts inherent to the executive promotion tournament process (Rosen, 1986; Williamson, 1975 ). An outsider CEO is not likely to gain leverage without significant organizational disruption and is unlikely to have the autonomy to introduce the necessary changes. Moreover, a single outsider, without any ability to dramatically alter the internal political landscape is unlikely to have critical mass in executives or a strong peer group in order to improve organizational performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . The outsider CEO is likely to be outnumbered and overwhelmed by the structural defenses available to the internal management team that they are able to neutralize the outsider's efforts. Indeed, Grusky's (1964) lab studies simulating leadership succession found that outsider succession without autonomy from insider team members led to resentment from incumbent subordinates and that this hostility impeded team effectiveness. In contrast, simulations in which outsider leadership was accompanied by the autonomy to introduce significant changes produced a number of alterations in the social dynamics of incumbent subordinates so as to permit change and subsequent team effectiveness.
The failure of AT&T's 1997 CEO succession is a real-world illustration of the Grusky (1964) simulation. Khurana (1999) , in his case study of the 1997 AT&T succession with outsider John Walters anointed to replace the retiring CEO, Robert Allen, shows that the internal management's militancy gave Walters little latitude to compromise without jeopardizing his authority, thus creating a win-lose situation.
Walters, whose authority to replace the existing executives was constrained by the board and the retiring Allen, found insiders retaliating by completely withdrawing their support for his proposals. Thus, while some change accompanied this conflict, the fact remained that the new outsider had little leverage from which to wage a successful change to the organization. This created a situation in which established organizational patterns will overwhelm the outsider's ability to improve organizational effectiveness. In fact, in both Gouldner's case study and the AT&T case, where natural departure was followed by an outsider succession, subsequent organizational performance deteriorated. This leads us to predict:
Hypothesis 2: Natural turnover followed by an outsider successor will lead to a decline in firm performance Similarly, the situation of an insider successor replacing a fired predecessor is also a conflicting type of succession with predictable negative repercussions for organizational effectiveness and performance. The insider successor will have difficulty introducing new organizational changes. The insider successor is likely to encounter resistance and will find the institution conservative toward change. As several scholars have shown (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Helmich & Brown, 1972) , even with the desire and will to change, insiders are not typically equipped with the organizational skill or experience to introduce the necessary changes to improve firm performance. In their indepth field research on CEO change, Greiner & Bhambri (1990) (BusinessWeek, 1996) .
The factor contributing to the difficulties that insiders face in introducing organization change is that regardless of the challenges a firm may be confronting, the insider "is as much a product of institutionalized understanding as any member of the old team...and [introduces] only incremental change" (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1994: p. 941 ).
Likewise, from the perspective of the entrenched executive team, the appointment of an insider CEO is usually interpreted as a tacit endorsement of the status quo (Ocasio, 1999) . This leads to the prediction that:
Hypothesis 3: Forced turnover followed by an insider will lead to a decline in firm performance Strategic Changes as a Mediator between Turnover and Performance.
As noted in the introduction, a competing alternative to our argument is the that it is strategic change, not change to internal organizational processes, that mediates the link between CEO turnover and performance. According to this view, new CEOs are uncommitted to the previous policies and strategies established by their predecessors.
Consequently, new CEOs, especially if they are replacing a fired predecessor or come from outside the organization, are more likely to implement difficult strategic changes such as restructuring a poorly performing firm reducing over-investment in research and development and capital expenditures, and transferring risk from principals to agents through increased leverage (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994: p. 1145). Our analyses control for this alternative explanation and the findings are discussed in the results and conclusion sections.
METHODS

Sample and Data Collection
The sample for our study is the Fortune 200 for 1978. We follow each of these firms through 1993. While the selection of the Fortune 200 limits the generalizability of our results, we decided on these firms because they are widely followed in the business media which in turn offers more complete information on company events than is available for smaller firms.
The data for chief executive turnover was collected from Standard and Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives. The Register is published annually and contains biographical information on the officers of publicly traded companies.
Additional information on chief executive turnover was collected from Forbes magazine's annual Executive Survey, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal Index. For the purpose of analysis, we coded data on CEO tenure, years with the firm, and age.
Financial data for the firms was obtained from Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT database. Data on changes to firm strategies was collected from the COMPUSTAT database and the Directory of Mergers and Acquisitions.
Dependent Variable
We used annual operating returns as evidence of improvement in firm performance (Smith, 1990) . The annual operating return for a firm is defined as the ratio of operating income before depreciation and taxes to operating assets. Because operating income does not include taxes, royalty, dividends, or interest income received, nor any dividends paid to stockholders and is highly correlated to long term stock measures, it is argued to be less subject to managerial manipulation and, therefore, a robust measure of changes in the operating performance of an organization (Smith, 1990; Denis & Denis, 1995) .
In order to control for industry-level effects, we examined performance on an industry-adjusted basis. We adjusted each measure by taking the difference between the firm operating performance and the same industry average. The industry average included all firms with the same 2-digit SIC code.
Independent Variables
Four categories of CEO turnover were created by combining the type of CEO departure and the origin of the successor. Natural and Forced Departures. We attempted to identify distinguishing characteristics of forced resignation from natural turnover. Few management changes, however, are described as terminations in press announcements (although in recent years dismissal announcements are becoming more common). For the purpose of this analysis, we created two discrete categories: natural turnover (coded 0) and forced turnover (coded 1).
Forced turnover includes cases in which a CEO departs prior to the age of 61 and does not leave for an equivalent position at another firm. Natural turnover consists of cases in which a CEO departs for another job or retirement. We also substituted the ages of 62, 60 and 59 and found no significant differences for our results. We chose the age of 61 because many CEO employment contracts are three-year contracts and most CEOs retire upon reaching their 65th birthday.
To provide additional support for our coding scheme we undertook two additional steps. First we examined details of each departure in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times. We coded each departure as either forced or natural. Comparing this to our age-based coding scheme, we found no disparity in our forced turnover coding. Next, working with one of the largest executive search firms in the United States, we reviewed our list of all CEO departures for our sample. Because executive search consultants have some insider knowledge of the circumstances surrounding a particular turnover, we asked two executive search consultants, specializing in CEO search, to review our forced and natural turnover classifications. With the exception of one turnover in which the CEO's illness was not announced, our coding scheme corresponded with the consultants' understanding of the turnover.
Insider and Outsider Successors. Successor characteristics are also coded dichotomously as outsider (coded 1) and insider (coded 0). We defined outside CEO appointments as one in which the new CEO assumes the title within one year that he or she joins the firm.
We classified CEOs who join the firm as long as one year prior to their appointment as outsiders because new CEOs who have employed at the firm for less than one year are likely to have been hired with the expectation that they would eventually be appointed to the CEO position. Hiring an executive before the succession can provide the candidate with an opportunity to obtain additional political and firm-specific human capital necessary for the position. While there is some ambiguity regarding a precise cut-off date for coding an outsider executive, our definition of outsider succession falls within the boundaries of existing research on the subject. For instance, Reinganum (1985) classified only executives who joined the firm at the time of the succession as outsiders, while Vancil (1987) included all executives who had been employed at the firm for five years or less. Strategic Variability. We created a variable to measure the degree to which a firm's strategy deviates following the appointment of a new CEO. We used five strategic indicators to create a composite measure of strategic change. The indicators of interest used to create the composite measure are downsizing (change in employment levels), corporate restructuring (number of acquisitions and divestitures), capital expenditures (change as percent of sales), research and development expenditures (change as percent of sales), and debt to equity ratio. Taken together, these indicators captured a broad spectrum of changes that might be expected following a major organizational event (Khanna & Poulsen, 1999; Kose, Lang, & Netter, 1992 ). At a more general level, these variables are proxies for changes to: structure (downsizing); strategy (restructuring); operations (capital expenditures and research and development); and financing (debt to equity). We examined the total change in these variables over a three year period. Gabarro (1987) found that three years is the typical period over which new executives introduced major changes to their organization.
Our strategic change composite variable is a variation of the strategic conformity measure developed by Finkelstein & Hambrick (1990) . Whereas Finkelstein & Hambrick (1990) used this variable to measure the degree to which a firm's strategy matches or deviates from the average strategic profile of its competitors in the same industry, we used it to measure the degree to which a firm's strategy either deviates or matches the average strategic profile of the firm under the predecessor CEO. The strategic variability measure was calculated as follows. Treating t as the year of the CEO turnover, the firm's cumulative three year changes for each strategic dimension was computed. Next these changes were measured at the year t-1, the last year of the predecessor's tenure.
Differences were taken for changes in each of the measures. We then compared whether individual changes for each of the five measures exceeded the industry average. Those changes that exceeded the industry average were coded as (1) and those that were below or equal to the industry average were coded as (0). The total number of changes were summed and used to create a limited continuous measure of change that varied from 0 to 5. The advantage of this measure was that it allowed for strategic heterogeneity among individual firms, while allowing for a comparable measure of total level of strategic change on an aggregated basis (see Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990 for further discussion).
Lagged Performance. We used a one-year lagged performance variable to correct for regression to the mean for the performance variable. Regression to the mean in this analysis on firm performance arises from the fact that we have included an endogenously determined variables, CEO turnover, in the model. In other words, firm performance may be related to firing the CEO since poorly performing firms are more likely to force out their CEO.
Probability of Exit. Because firms drop out of our sample during the fifteen year period of observation, we needed to control for sample selection bias. The problem of sample selection bias arises from the fact that firms do not drop out of our sample randomly thereby creating a correlation problem between the error term and the independent variables of interest. In our case, firms that drop out of the sample are likely to do so because of poor performance. Poor performance can make a firm vulnerable to takeover, bankruptcy, or a merger. As a result, without correcting for those firms dropping out of our sample, we would have restricted the value of the dependent variable--firm performance--and thus biased our estimates.
Given this issue, the best way to deal with the sample selection problem was to incorporate a hazard rate for each firm for dropping out of the sample. The hazard rate was estimated from the following equation: where:
x 1 is whether a firm had a hostile takeover attempt in the preceding two years x 2 is whether a firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the preceding two years x 3 is industry adjusted firm performance
The specification of the model was based on the reasoning that for our Fortune 200 sample, the reasons for exit are either merger, acquisition, or liquidation following bankruptcy. Since our data are annual measures, we used a discrete-time event history analysis to generate a probability that a firm will exit, given that firms are always at risk of exiting the sample (Allison, 1984) . The predicted values from the equation are included in the lagged model as an independent variable to generate the estimate for a firm dropping out of our sample. In the econometric literature, this approach is referred to as a Heckman (1976) selection model.
Analysis
The hypotheses in Table 1 , which relates turnover type to firm performance, can be characterized empirically by the following model:
where: Y it is firm performance X 1it are the independent variables of the various CEO turnovers X 2it is the probability of a firm dropping out of our sample Y it-1 is firm performance lagged one year W 1i is 1 for the i th firm and 0 otherwise
The model is a random-effects model. Random-effects models, through the inclusion of a dummy term for each firm, control for unobserved heterogeneity between firms. The major difference between random-effects model and conventional OLS analysis is the inclusion of the term W 1i and an error term with two components. The W 1i
term is a firm-specific component that represents unobserved characteristics of the firm that can effect firm performance but are not formally included in the model. In our case the W 1i term can be thought to capture unobserved differences between firms, such as the quality of their products or technology or board of directors. The two-term error component is represented by e it + m it . The purpose of including a two component error term is that e it can capture the systematic error of the independent variables and m it captures the error terms associated with the unobserved variables of W 1i (for a detailed statistical discussion on random-effects models, see Greene 1997 ; for an application, see Lafontaine & Shaw, 1996) . Table 1 presents the correlation table and the associated means and standard deviations for each of the variables in the analysis.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
__________________________________________________________________
Insert Table 1 about here   Table 2 presents a summary of the various types of turnover. From our 200 firm sample, we identified 221 CEO turnovers. The average firm had at least one turnover during the sample period. Of the 221 turnovers, 46 are coded as forced (21%). This percentage of forced turnover is slightly less than the 28% reported by Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) , but the differences can be attributed to coding techniques. Warner et. al (1988) defined forced turnover as all departures that took place prior to age 65 with the exception of those due to illness, death, or leaving for another position. As discussed previously, our three-step coding scheme is more conservative since it picks the earlier retirement age of 61.
Insider appointments represented 85% to total appointments. This is greater than the 71% which Worrell, et. al. (1993) reported. However, our higher proportion of insiders is not surprising given that our sample consists of the largest 200 firms which are more likely to have a larger pool of internal candidates to choose from (Osterman, 1984) . Table 2 also presents descriptive statistics on the relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. A comparison of the statistics for the forced and natural turnovers in Panel A revealed that firms in which forced turnover took place performed relatively more poorly than those firms in which voluntary turnover took place. The relative differences in performance are consistent with the notion advanced by Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny (1988) that directors consider performance relative to other industry firms, not absolute levels of firm performance, when they make turnover decisions.
With respect to insider versus outsider succession and performance, Table 2 indicates outsider succession, on average, more often occurs in poorly performing firms.
Insert Table 2 about here CEO Turnover and Performance
In Table 3 we tested the effects of different types of turnover on subsequent firm performance. Model 1 examines the effect of all CEO turnovers against the omitted category of no turnover. In the random-effects model, all the identification for the turnover coefficient emerged from firms that underwent a CEO change. The results show that turnover alone does not predict either improving or declining firm performance in the subsequent three years (p<.18). The control variable for sample selection bias (Hazard Rate) indicates that the higher the probability of a firm dropping out of the sample the poorer the subsequent firm performance (p<.001). This finding is not surprising when we consider that poorly performing firms are more likely to be acquisition targets or file for bankruptcy.
Insert Table 3 about here Our control variable for strategic change (Strategic Changes) following CEO turnover is not significant (p <.22). This null result was robust across all specifications, including when interacted with the various types of turnover. This finding is supportive of the view that because organizations operate within severe constraints, external factors largely determine organizational actions and strategic choices (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Fligstein, 1990) .
Model 2 distinguishes between forced and natural turnover against the base case of no turnover. The effect of forced or natural turnover on subsequent firm performance was not significant (p>.10). This finding is consistent with previous research that has examined forced turnover, independently of successor characteristics. Weisbach (1988) and others (Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988) identified weak correlations between forced turnover and performance.
Model 3 examines the relationship between insider versus outsider succession.
Again, the results for insider versus outsider succession do not impact subsequent firm performance. As discussed earlier, the insider-outsider distinction may be meaningless without explicitly taking into account the conditions surrounding the departure of the predecessor. Specifically, outsider CEO's may not be able to execute significant organizational changes without the antecedent disruption to an organization's routines and procedures caused by CEO dismissal. Model 4 tests the hypothesized relationships between the circumstances surrounding the departure of the predecessor, the origin of the successor and firm performance.
Examined against the omitted category of no CEO turnover, Model 4 indicates no statistical relationship between natural turnover followed by an insider and subsequent changes to firm performance. While we must exercise some caution in interpreting this result, Frick (1995) notes that null results can be interpreted under conditions when a null result is possible and the findings are consistent within a broader theoretical framework.
The lack of a relationship between natural turnover followed by an insider and subsequent changes to performance is consistent with the perspective that this type of turnover reinforces a firm's status quo and, therefore, is unlikely to have any significant implications for the firm.
In contrast, for firms that experienced a forced turnover followed by an outsider, performance improves by 4.4% (p<.01) thus supporting Hypothesis 1. Because forced turnover is a disruptive organizational event and creates conditions for organizational change, the appointment of an outsider increases the likelihood that significant organizational changes will occur. Consequently, under the dismissal condition, outsider succession leads to improved firm performance.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are also examined in Model 4. We predicted that natural turnover followed by an outsider (Hypothesis 2) and forced turnover followed by insider (Hypothesis 3) would conflict and lead to declining firm performance. While Model 4 strongly supports Hypothesis 2, it does not support Hypothesis 3. For forced turnover followed by an insider, performance changes are negligible and insignificant (.1%, p<.11). Model 4 indicates that when natural turnover is followed by an outsider, performance declines an average of 5.8% (p<.01).
CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that CEO turnover in organizations should be understood as a process encompassing both the departure of the predecessor and the origin of the successor. Our review of past research and various accounts of succession indicates that these events are often treated separately. We then presented a theory suggesting that the conditions surrounding the departure of a predecessor and the origin of successor are intertwined and the effects of CEO turnover on firm performance is better understood by considering both events. This discussion led to our identifying four types of CEO turnover: (1) natural turnover followed by an insider; (2) natural turnover followed by an outsider; (3) forced turnover followed by an insider; and (4) forced turnover followed by an outsider. Our empirical results demonstrate that examining CEO turnover as encompassing both departure and succession sheds light on the relationship between executive succession and firm performance.
Consistent with established perspectives, our results indicated that natural turnover followed by an insider had little effect on subsequent changes to firm performance. We hypothesized, however, that the most disruptive type of CEO departure, forced turnover, when combined with outsider succession, would result in subsequent performance improvements. Forced turnover, because of its disruptive effects, creates the potential for significant organizational change. Outsider successors, because of their capacity to enact dramatic change, creates the potential to realize significant organizational change. We found compelling evidence that forced turnover when followed by outsider succession improves subsequent firm performance.
With respect to natural turnover followed by an outsider and forced turnover followed by an insider, our hypotheses are only partially supported. We did not find support for the hypothesis that forced turnover followed by an insider results in deteriorating performance. An ex-post explanation for this null result is that while forced turnover creates a condition for change, the insider change agent is futile to affect change.
The consequence of this futility is the persistence of the status quo. Thus, no change in performance should be expected. Further examination of this issue is obviously warranted.
We did, however, find support for our hypothesis that a natural turnover followed by an outsider leads to declining organizational performance. In this turnover condition organizational resistance to change does not remain neutral, but rather heightened and aggravated with the presence of an outsider. This finding is consistent with previous qualitative research on succession where outsiders are actively sabotaged when introduced to an established team (Grusky, 1964) .
We believe that our study goes further than any previous study on this topic by attempting to distinguish between the strategic choice explanation that links CEO turnover to firm performance and our proposed process explanation. By controlling for the level of strategic change that follows turnover, we isolated those performance effects related to subsequent strategic changes from those related to the type of CEO turnover.
Consistent with the literature that strategic actions are largely determined by external constraints, we found that the strategic changes introduced by new CEOs were insufficient to trigger a performance effect. Our results were most aligned with the organizational demography literature, which points to the importance of turnover and succession for explaining organizational outcomes. Our findings provided strong support for Pfeffer's (1983; view that the primary mechanism through which managerial turnover affects firm performance is its impact on the social processes within the firm.
Our described relationship between turnover, social processes, and firm performance also complements recent work in the strategy literature. Specifically, the resource-based view of the firm-a paradigm that focuses on internal, firm-level capabilities for explaining performance and competitive advantage-has highlighted the role of social and interaction dynamics among managers as the major factor contributing to an organization's adaptive capabilities. Kogut and Zander (1993) found, for example, that slight changes to firm-level social practices-practices which cannot be singularly quantified or isolated-acted in complementary ways to impact performance.
In the final few paragraphs we would like to discuss the limitations of our research and then its implications for future research. With respect to limitations, one might argue that the aggregate nature of our data is a reason for the lack of support for the strategic choice perspective of CEO turnover. That is, the null finding on the effect of strategic change on firm performance highlight the limitations of our research design.
Because we did not find support for the strategic choice perspective of CEO turnover, it is important to consider some possible reasons for this result. One explanation is that the form of strategic changes we considered are incomplete. One could argue that we ignored other critical strategic changes that could account for the observed differences. While this may be true, the changes we considered are commonly described in research as critical to affecting firm performance. If performance is significantly affected by strategic changes we have not considered here, this suggests that we may need to revisit much of the empirical literature on CEO turnover because it has emphasized the wrong strategic variables.
Another possibility is the types of strategic changes following CEO turnover may be more nuanced than those captured by purely statistical data. Thus, while our measures captured the magnitude and direction of these changes, they do not capture, for example, how innovative or appropriate these changes are for particular organization's situation.
Indeed, Tushman and Rosenkopf (1996) argue convincingly that a more appropriate measure of strategic adaptation is management turnover and outsider succession. In their detailed single industry study of executive turnover and strategic changes, the authors concluded that the performance consequences associated with executive turnover are "independent of the content of actions taken" (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996: p. 950 ).
Future research which examines a few industries in-depth presents a possible way for examining the link between turnover type and the appropriateness of particular strategic changes within specific industrial contexts.
In addition to examining the relationship between departure and succession, a contribution of our research is utilizing new empirical techniques for examining the relationship between organizational events and firm performance. By using a random effects model we control for firm level heterogeneity across time in order to isolate the effects of the turnover event for performance from other organizational factors. Our approach also allows us to compare turnover against the baseline of no turnover. This too is distinct from previous research in this area which usually selects on the occurrence of the turnover event and therefore may confound performance changes associated with CEO turnover alone with those associated with the type of turnover (see Worrell, et al, 1993 as an example).
The research also has theoretical implications for future research on organizational change. By highlighting the two aspects of succession, turnover type and the origin of the successor, the findings demonstrate the interaction of both structural factors and individual agents in affecting organizational change. In contrast to theories that emphasize either structural determinants or methodological individualism for explaining organizational change, our findings suggest that these are interacting factors.
That is, changes in organizational performance are a consequence of structural factors, such as CEO firings, which create the capacity for organizational change and individual agents who possess the capacity to execute these changes.
Our findings obviously call for further empirical study and replication across different populations of organizations. Meanwhile, however, we can confidently say that CEO turnover is a critical organizational event, encompassing both the processes of departure and succession, and that the combination of forced versus natural turnover and insider versus outsider succession can significantly affect organizational performance. Performance is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation and taxes to total assets (OIBD/TA). Firm level operating performance is then subtracted for the 2-digit SIC industry average. .76 ***p<.01 a N=1977; Performance is measured as operating income before depreciation and taxes divide by total assets. Performance is industry adjusted at the 2-digit SIC level. The random-effects model controls for unobserved firm level heterogeneity, assuming that firm differences are randomly drawn from an underlying probability distribution.
